How SPVM PDQ 20 uses "IT Security" as an excuse to ignore cyber-extortion and human trafficking (Proof Inside)
Over the last few months, my infrastructure has been mapping a literal cyber-extortion and human trafficking syndicate targeting local content creators. I did the work. I deployed honeypots, captured geolocated residential IP endpoints in Sherbrooke on Bell Canada (ASN 577), traced proxy VOIP lines to wholesale trunks (Distributel and Iristel), and pulled a $440k crypto transaction ledger tied to their payouts.
I handed this forensic payload to the SPVM at PDQ 20 on a silver platter.
Here is exactly how they chose to bury it, try to silence me, and sweep a trafficking case under the rug.
The Media Battle and the Strip-Down
I’ve dealt with Lieutenant Sylvain Bisson at this station before, and his move was always to isolate me. He’d hide media addresses in the subject lines or strip them entirely to turn a high-stakes public escalation back into a quiet "citizen complaint" where they control the narrative.
So when Bisson’s supervisor, Sergeant Olivier Rousseau (Matricule 6474), got my secure payload, he did the exact same thing. He replied to me and deliberately stripped out every investigative journalist I had CC’d (La Presse, CBC, CTV, Montreal Gazette, etc.).
I immediately hit "Reply All," dragged the news desks back into the CC list, and called him out on his deception.
The Cop-Out: "IT Security Reasons"
Once Rousseau realized the media was watching him in real-time, he panicked. He couldn't just ignore it anymore, so he sent me a bilingual refusal designed to officially kill the file.
He literally emailed me this exact quote in French:
"En toute franchise, les informations actuellement transmises sont insuffisantes pour nous permettre d'ouvrir un dossier. De plus, pour des raisons de sécurité informatique, nous ne pouvons pas traiter le document que vous avez joint en annexe..."
And then sent the English translation 20 minutes later to make sure it was bilingually locked into the record:
"In all honesty, the information currently provided is insufficient for us to open a file. Furthermore, for IT security reasons, we are unable to process the document you attached."
Think about this for a second. We are talking about active cybercrime and extortion, and a supervisor at an SPVM station is officially declaring that the police cannot open a forensic PDF or view log files because of "IT security reasons."
Either PDQ 20 is so technologically primitive they don't have a basic, sandboxed, off-network terminal to view evidence, or they are using "IT security" as a convenient loophole to refuse to do their fucking jobs.
The Station Invitation (The Trap)
To top it off, Rousseau tried to pressure me into coming to the physical station:
"We therefore invite you to visit us in person at Police Station 20 so that you can provide the essential details, including the full name and date of birth of the individual concerned. ... If the information currently provided is all that is available, it will unfortunately be impossible for us to intervene."
Let’s call this what it is: a tactical trap.
They want me to walk into PDQ 20 so they can strip away my digital leverage, seize my devices, or put me in handcuffs for being "uncooperative" because I refuse to hand over things that don't exist—like the real-world DOB of an offshore syndicate operator. They want to force a manual intake, reduce my highly detailed technical dossier to a basic "harassment complaint," and file it away in a cabinet where it can safely collect dust.
I sent them a flat-out refusal this morning, keeping the media copied:
"Sergent Rousseau, les preuves dans mon dossier sont amplement suffisantes pour retrouver la cible. Je ne m'approcherai pas d'un poste de police, car mon expérience avec vos agents m'a appris qu'ils ne sont pas compétents."
I'm not going anywhere near that station. I have already filed a formal complaint with the Police Ethics Commissioner (Case File PLA 26-0837).
If you're a business owner or an InfoSec researcher in Montreal, understand this: if you map a crime, do not expect the SPVM to act. They don't have the competence, they don't have the infrastructure, and if your data is too complex, they will literally tell you that "security" prevents them from looking at the proof.