但这三种功能的共同特征是:它们都是辅助性的,而非变革性的。真正能够推动裁判尺度变化的路径仍然是——正如过去十余年的经验所证明的——具体案件中的影响性诉讼,以及由此产生的指导性案例和裁判规则积累。信访回复可以记录战场的位置,但不能赢得战斗本身。
注释
¹ 参见微信公众号"中和彩虹说"对该信访回复的法律分析文章,原文链接:
mp.weixin.qq.com/s/U1VX7omST…。该文对信访回复的法律效力、与司法解释的区别、以及措辞模板化特征作出了详细论证。
² Greg Distelhorst & Yue Hou, "Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China," The Journal of Politics 79, no. 3 (2017): 1024–1040. DOI: 10.1086/690948.
³ Jidong Chen, Jennifer Pan & Yiqing Xu, "Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China," American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 2 (2016): 383–400. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12207.
⁴ Jieren Hu, Xuan Gong & Yun Zhao, "Mechanical Responsiveness: China's Online Petition System," The China Quarterly 262 (2025): 293–309. DOI: 10.1017/S0305741025000220.
⁵ Yuan Wang & Rongbin Han, "Cosmetic Responsiveness: Why and How Local Authorities Respond to Mundane Online Complaints in China," Journal of Chinese Political Science 28 (2023): 187–207. DOI: 10.1007/s11366-022-09798-z.
⁶ Christopher Heurlin, Responsive Authoritarianism in China: Land, Protests, and Policy Making (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). Heurlin的分析以征地抗议为核心经验对象。
⁶ᵃ 此处"身份承认类诉求不易获得让步"的判断系综合多项研究的推论,而非Heurlin原文的直接论点。支撑这一推论的文献包括:Diana Fu & Greg Distelhorst, "Grassroots Participation and Repression under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping," The China Journal 79 (2017): 100–122(分析了习近平时期公民社会参与空间的收窄);以及Chen、Pan和Xu(同注³)关于集体行动威胁作为回应性核心驱动力的发现——该发现的反面含义是,缺乏集体行动威胁能力的群体更难获得实质回应。
⁷ 该观点出自
@Nevernessian对原帖的评论,原文指出"身份歧视是西方式的,不符合全民主义和调和主义的社会基调",并区分了身份歧视救济与一般人格权保护在法律逻辑上的根本差异。
⁸ 同注³。
⁹ Human Rights Watch, Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China, vol. 17, no. 5(C) (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 2005). 该报告第四章"Continuing Crackdown in Henan Province"详细记录了地方政府对HIV感染者集体信访的截访、拘押和选择性补偿机制。全文见:
hrw.org/reports/2005/china06…
⁹ᵃ Xi Chen, Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Chen基于约一千份集体信访政府档案,分析了信访制度如何在结构上将集体诉求导向个案化处理。另见 Carl F. Minzner, "Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions," Stanford Journal of International Law 42 (2006): 103–179,该文分析了信访制度作为"多功能治理工具"如何在制度激励上鼓励诉求个案化。
⁹ᵇ Fenggang Yang, "The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China," The Sociological Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2006): 93–122. 该文提出的"三色市场"分析框架揭示了中国宗教管理体制如何通过登记制度制造合法/非法的边界,使大量宗教实践处于制度性模糊地带。
¹⁰ Rui Hou, "Maintaining Social Stability without Solving Problems: Emotional Repression in the Chinese Petition System," The China Quarterly 243 (2020): 635–654. DOI: 10.1017/S0305741019001504.
¹¹ "silence and invisibility"的概括引自 Joy L. Chia 的表述,转引自 Jie Cheng, "The Legal Status of LGBTQ in China: A Law and Politics Perspective," Constitutional Forum constitutionnel 32, no. 4 (2024): 31–38, DOI: 10.21991/cf29471。Cheng引述Chia原话为:"[S]ilence and invisibility (rather than overt homophobia or anti-LGBTQ violence) define how LGBTQ individuals experience their daily lives in China." 本文未查阅Chia原始出处,仅依据Cheng文中的转引。
¹² UN Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994). 该案确立了性取向属于《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》第26条"地位"类别的先例。
¹³ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Being LGBTI in China: A National Survey on Social Attitudes towards Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Gender Expression (Beijing: UNDP, 2016).