The Iranian regime's 'Trojan Horse' strategy in the UK—exploiting the charity sector to build soft power, spread Khomeinist ideology, and potentially enable influence or repression—should spark urgent discussion about similar patterns across the EU.
Lord Walney's March 2026 report "Undue Influence: The Iranian Regime’s Abuse of the UK Charity System" exposes a network of over 30 organisations, including 10 charities (8 under slow Charity Commission probes), with ties to Iranian bodies. These promote reverence for Khamenei/Soleimani, host Quds Day events with antisemitic rhetoric, support proxies like Hezbollah/Hamas, and indoctrinate youth—while fostering hostility toward dissidents and British Jews. Fears of racism accusations have delayed robust action, allowing these "soft power hubs" to operate amid Iran's espionage/transnational repression threats.
This mirrors patterns elsewhere in Europe. For example, Germany banned the Islamic Centre Hamburg (IZH) in 2024 as a regime proxy promoting extremism, antisemitism, and Hezbollah support; related networks (e.g., Al-Mustafa Berlin branch) face ongoing extremism probes and scrutiny over hundreds of affiliates.
But the core issue is the security concerns highlighted in Walney's report.
Screenshot 1: "...there is evidence of governance and personnel overlap, both with regime-linked institutions in Iran and among the UK-based charities themselves. Senior figures associated with UK charities have held senior roles within Iran’s clerical or political establishment, or have been appointed, recognised, or publicly endorsed by regime authorities."
Screenshot 2: "UK authorities assess Iran as posing an active state threat, including espionage and transnational repression. The Intelligence and Security Committee has warned that state-linked institutions such as ICEL may present espionage risks. Charities can provide platforms for engagement with the public, parliamentarians, universities, local authorities and international bodies. A former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has described such activity, when undertaken by hostile states, as capable of constituting a form of espionage."
In short, what appears as charity work can mask or support state-directed malign activity in an open society, heightening vulnerability to espionage, repression, and broader national security threats from a regime assessed as persistent and unpredictable.
The Iranian regime's strategy is not unique. Other state actors, terrorist organisations, and extremist networks—with the resources and intent—have long exploited similar vulnerabilities in Europe's charity, religious, and cultural sectors for influence, funding, or cover. Examples include sham charities funnelling support to groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, as flagged in EU counter-terrorism efforts and international reports.
EU countries grapple with regulatory gaps: narrow oversight focuses on compliance, not systemic foreign influence/extremism; slow probes and limited intel-sharing hinder effective deterrence. The Walney report's UK-specific recommendations—expanded Charity Commission powers to address ideology/foreign ties, trustee disqualifications, faster investigations, transparency, and Gift Aid restrictions—could inspire continent-wide reforms to safeguard open societies from this deliberate infiltration undermining security, cohesion, and vulnerable communities.
Time for coordinated EU action against these threats.
Download the full report:
powerfulstreet.com/Undue_Inf…
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