Honored to be included in @FortuneMagazine’s inaugural Crypto 100 list. Sky Protocol is featured in the Stablecoins category, with USDS ranking as the third-largest stablecoin in the world after Tether and Circle. See the full list ↓

"The idea that a newly issued security (IPO), brought to market at a time of the seller's choosing and surrounded by massive hype - is the single best bargain among thousands of global businesses is an absolute nonsense."

在此之前如果机构想把托管在BitGo里的闲置资金存入Defi协议赚取收益，BitGo出于合规为了防止盲签和被盗，不能直接把钱打出去到Defi的存款合约地址，机构必须要把钱先从BitGo里提出来到外部地址，然后再手动打入Defi协议，这意味着拖离了合规框架，会直接触发内部风控和审计，尤其是银行、保险、养老金等机构，而Spark在机构级借贷又卖出了重要一步，BitGo的托管资金可以在不离开合规框架范围内就将资金存入到Spark中赚取收益，而且Spark会根据资金预先设定好的风险偏好等参数，将资金分配到多个不同的借贷市场，从而避免了单点风险。 这个过程是通过集成Narval网关实现的，在BitGo和Defi之间搭建了一个专用的通信频道，Narval会把要操作的Defi协议翻译成人类可读的形式，杜绝盲签，并自动检查预设合约白名单和机构政策，最后通过BitGo的多签执行，从而实现全程没有脱离BitGo的合规托管范围，由BitGo在托管账户里直接操作存入Defi，而资金也依然可以继续显示在BitGo的账户里，这一套方案是符合当前所有主流机构的合规要求。

SparkLend’s wBTC deposit cap is increasing from 3,000 to 30,000 wBTC. Since launch, the initial cap has been nearly fully utilized. Demand for BTC-backed borrowing on a second on-chain venue was real, and it came fast! This increase is managed through the cap automator mechanism. In practice, new capacity will open at up to 500 WBTC every 12 hours, scaling exposure gradually rather than all at once. Put your wBTC to work on SparkLend. 👇 app.spark.fi/markets

SparkLend USDT APY is at ~20.8% rn. USDT debt is overcollateralized by bluechip collaterals. app.spark.fi/markets/1/0xdAC… spark.blockanalitica.com/v1/… Don't FOMO.

Sky Ecosystem (14.84b TVL) has become the 2nd-largest DeFi protocol, behind only Lido (21.7b TVL).

Laniakea: Sky's infrastructure for Institutional Capital forum.skyeco.com/t/laniakea-…

RT @Marczeller: SPK FDV doubled since that announcement. The zeller effect.

Spark Savings spUSDT is the ONLY liquid defi deposit for USDT Aave Core: illiquid for past 2 days (and potential bad debt for rsETH hack) Morpho: currently all major vaults/markets are at 100% utilization @sparkdotfi Savings: >$400 million in instantly available liquidity

Over the past year, I received 83.7M $SPK from @sparkdotfi as rewards, and dump them on @CoWSwap for 663 ETH and 1.4M USD. I’m feeling some regret now.

Claude explains the $71M @arbitrum clawback: What this transaction is Tx: 0x5618...0f6b on Arbitrum, block 454686044, April 21, 2026 03:35 UTC From: 0x5d39...7Ccc — labeled on Arbiscan as “Kelp DAO Exploiter 1” To: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000DA0 — a special system/recovery sink (not the normal 0x...dEaD burn address) Value: 30,765.667 ETH (~$71M) — effectively the entire Arbitrum-side balance of the attacker’s hub wallet Tx type: ArbitrumUnsignedTxType (EIP-2718 type 0x65 / 101) The “type 101” is the key. That is not a user-signed transaction — a normal EOA physically cannot produce one. ArbitrumUnsignedTxType is an ArbOS system transaction that only the chain itself (via the sequencer / ArbOS upgrade path controlled by the Arbitrum Security Council) can inject. It bypasses the attacker’s private key entirely. The remediation (this tx): Arbitrum’s Security Council used its emergency powers to inject an ArbitrumUnsignedTxType that forcibly moved the attacker’s full 30,765 ETH from the hub address into a protocol-controlled recovery sink (0x...0DA0). Why it’s “extraordinary” Arbitrum did not perform a reorg or historical rewrite — the chain’s ordering is intact. Instead, the Security Council used a privileged state-override transaction type that is part of ArbOS but has essentially never been used before. It is functionally a state-level clawback: the attacker’s private key still signs txs, but that address’s ETH was moved by the chain itself. This is the mechanism Arbitrum’s progressive-decentralization docs reserve for “catastrophic” emergencies (12-of-N Security Council action), and this is one of the clearest public demonstrations of it being invoked. Note that it only recovered the Arbitrum leg of the theft — the ~75,700 ETH on Ethereum is outside Arbitrum’s control and remains with the attacker, which is why Aave is still facing up to ~$230M of potential bad debt on the Ethereum side. Sources: Arbiscan tx: arbiscan.io/tx/0x5618044241d… Arbitrum Docs — ArbOS / Sequencer forced inclusion: docs.arbitrum.io/run-arbitru… Arbitrum Foundation — progressive decentralization & Security Council: docs.arbitrum.foundation/sta…

近期defi坏账的问题，有人开始看空ETH了，实际上这跟以太坊本身安全性没有任何关系。 这次rsETH问题，包括今年发生的大部分黑客事件，都跟权限失守、风险控制有关，底层合约编码问题占比越来越少。 这种现象背后是一个技术与人性交织的问题，互联网的发展也经历过类似阶段， 早期安全事故， 更多与实现缺陷和编码逻辑有关，后来随着工程能力提高，纯技术问题会逐渐变成“已知问题”，而攻击重点就会不断转向账户、身份、权限和供应链转移。 区块链今天面对的，正是这种历史的重复。

Laniakea is a project in Sky to bring all structures of governance and collateral exposure into standardized formats, with strict standardization and best practice optimization across 4 critical dimensions: Smart contracts, risk management, data infrastructure and legal recourse. With Laniakea in place Sky itself will enjoy even greater levels of security, stability and reliability (on top of the protocols current 6 year track record of no security incidents) External protocols and projects will also be able to use the Laniakea building blocks to develop financial products and businesses through Sky Agents that inherits the best in class smart contracts, risk management, data infrastructure and legal structures - protecting their users and boosting their business case. github.com/sky-ecosystem/lan…

Quite impressive that Sparks spUSDT was the only USDT yield product in all of DeFi that kept having liquidity throughout all of this. Literally every single other USDT market seized up - I have a feeling Spark will be getting a lot more clients after all this blows over

Sparklend saw meaningful inflows over the past two days, with active loans also increasing ~$350m It is the outlier amidst the sector-wide contraction following the rsETH exploit

Spark在1月份就停掉了rsETH相关的市场，所以在这次安全事件中没有受到波及。 与其他协议不同，Spark在借贷市场上的安全控制策略是主动收紧，而不是扩张。 整个Sky体系都是这种风控哲学，虽然可能导致协议发展缓慢，但在关键时刻体现出了价值。

Spark is focused on maximizing user safety across our product suite this is why we deprecated rsETH (alongside other low-usage assets) in January, and continue to tighten the collateral and feature-set over time it's also why we have continued to set a high max-rate on our SparkLend ETH market. this was not very popular among eth-loopers, and likely lost us considerable business and revenue to aave markets over the past year as aave cut max borrow rates on ETH to 10% or less but in the current situation, it is clear that our approach was the prudent choice, with SparkLend continuing to have ample liquidity for ETH withdrawals while Aave markets across Mainnet, Arbitrum, Plasma, Mantle, and Base are locked up because ETH is a core collateral asset, illiquidity isnt just an inconvenience for depositors, it presents a critical safety risk where liquidations of ETH collateral cannot take place while markets are at 100% utilization. with current illiquidity conditions on Aave, a 15-20% ETHUSD price drop could cause significant bad debt accumulation (on top of any potential issues attributable to the direct rsETH exploit) stay safe, use Spark

一个秘密：闲鱼 跨境电商 = 王道。