Adding to the Tesla/Rivian/Lucid example described below, another interesting data point:
Of the top 10 US companies by secondary market demand, SpaceX and Neuralink have the most conservative funding trajectory.
A 24-year-old company launching huge rockets into space (and catching them) has raised significantly less per year than a payment processor and an enterprise data platform.
A 10-year-old company building brain-computer interfaces that are helping manage serious disabilities has raised less per year than two gambling platforms.
There is a lesson here about the way Musk approaches financing his companies.
"Because funds have become larger in real dollar terms, many venture capital organizations have invested larger amounts of money in each portfolio company. Firms have attempted to do this in two ways. First, there has been a movement to finance later-stage companies that can accept larger blocks of financing. Second, venture firms are syndicating less. This leads to greater competition for making later-stage investments.”
The Venture Capital Revolution, by Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner
The pathology of venture capital is not hard to unravel.
The market expanded, with more capital chasing deals, creating larger and later investments. Companies now stay private longer, and more future growth is priced into each financing event.
The metrics to attract investment in private markets are revenue, growth rate and gross margins.
As companies raise more private capital, they spend longer focusing on these metrics. This mirrors what what Startup Genome described as "premature scaling", where a company overdevelops along one dimension, at a cost to others.
Indeed, revenue, growth and gross margins do not provide a full picture of company health. As implied by 'Goodhart's Law', as these metrics became a target they can mask a deeper financial malaise.
Imagine, for example, if the NBA understood a good basketball player purely by how tall they were and how fast they ran. The league would be packed with frenetic 7-foot-tall monsters and a terrible quality of play.
As a result, companies with an extended life in private markets become structurally and almost inevitably overvalued. While investors can protect against this with additional terms, to an extent, those terms do not extend to common stock holders.
“Reported unicorn post-money valuations average 48% above fair value, with 14 being more than 100% above. [...] Common shares lack all such protections and are 56% overvalued.”
Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, by Will Gornall and Ilya Strebulaev
As a result, venture backed companies (particularly those that have raised the most) now struggle to find a profitable exit.
Exits are where rubber hits the road. It's where venture marks, which are notoriously unreliable, suddenly have to match up with real-world expectations. This is especially difficult in hot markets or hot categories.
"We show that an increase in the supply of venture capital (VC) leads to a decline in the quality of firms going public. ... both post-IPO operating profits and post-IPO sales growth are lower when the supply of VC capital is high."
The Rise of Venture Capital and IPO Quality, by Amrita Nain, Jie Ying and Joseph Arthur
This structural overvaluation makes venture-backed companies less appealing targets for acquisition, but it's harder to see the consequence of that beyond sluggish M&A.
Where it's more obvious is in IPOs, where not only are there fewer public offerings but those companies also more obviously struggle once public thanks to the visibility on their share price.
A substantial post-lockup dip is now a feature of most venture-backed IPOs, and where companies have raised multiple billions that dip lasts longer and is increasingly negative.
“Our results do indicate that the deregulation of private markets has played a significant role in bringing about a new equilibrium where fewer high-growth startups go public. Importantly, our results strongly point to the fact that this new equilibrium has not come about by some unfortunate freeze of the IPO market.”
The Deregulation of the Private Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs, by Michael Ewens and Joan Farre-Mensa
For context, of the 10 US-listed companies that raised more than $3B in venture capital, 8 were negative at lockup expiry and the group has a market adjusted performance of -63%.
And it's completely unnecessary, even for capital-intensive companies. Tesla raised $105 million prior to its IPO, compared to $10.6 billion for Rivian and $3.4 billion for Lucid.
Only one of those companies is clearly a winner today, generating a vastly greater sum of economic value. The other two, however, enabled much greater fee income for their investors.
This explains why some venture firms have responded to this new reality by specifically backing the 'tallest and fastest basketball players', and benefitting from the ease of herding capital into that category. The volume of capital raised is their main metric of success, with scale and predictability are their product on which they charge fees.
Others investors, particularly those with LPs that care about distributions, need to think more carefully about how they steward investments to an exit. That means being conservative with capital and ensuring companies properly develop along all dimensions.
That also neatly aligns with the original description of venture capital, provided by Gompers and Lerner in their 2001 paper, "providing capital to firms that might otherwise have difficulty attracting financing."
If a company can easily raise capital on generous terms, then it's definitionally not a venture investment and is unlikely to produce the required returns.
The only question is, do you care about the returns?