RT @PressSec_JP: 日英首脳会談では、G7サミットも見据え、エネルギーや重要鉱物のサプライチェーンなどでの協力強化について議論しました。日英で初めてとなる経済安全保障協力に関する共同宣言を発出することとなりました。

'the “fifth largest defence budget in the world” bought nowhere near the fifth most capable armed forces' - a must read with more zingers from @edwardstrngr65 .newstatesman.com/politics/uk…

China has just released new State Council regulations on outbound investment (《国务院关于对外投资的规定》), significantly tightening controls on Chinese investors investing abroad. The new rules expand the scope of state oversight and further integrate outbound investment into China’s broader national security, export control, and data governance framework. Key provisions include: 1. The definition of “investor” has been broadened. Previously, the rules mainly applied to domestic enterprises and organizations (中国境内的企业、其他组织). The new regulations explicitly include individual residents (居民个人). Article 27 also states that investors who fail to complete required approval or filing procedures for overseas investment may face fines and confiscation of illegal income. This likely explains last week’s draconian restrictions on Chinese individuals investing through foreign stock brokers. 2. Article 13 directly links outbound investment to China’s export control regime. Investors are prohibited from exporting or using banned goods, technologies, services, or related data abroad, and restricted items require prior authorization. The provision also covers indirect technology transfer through cross-border deployment of personnel, technical guidance, overseas work arrangements, or training programs. In effect, outbound investment is now explicitly tied to China’s controls over technology, data, and talent flows. 3. Article 15 incorporates outbound investment into China’s national security review system. Relevant State Council departments may review overseas investments, asset transfers, or disposals that affect or may affect national security. Organizations and individuals are required to cooperate fully and comply with review decisions. This provision is particularly noteworthy when read alongside the recent ban involving Manus. 4. Article 22 further restricts cooperation with foreign legal and regulatory authorities. Chinese organizations or individuals involved in overseas litigation, arbitration, or foreign investigations must comply with China’s laws on state secrets, data security, personal information protection, export controls, and judicial assistance before providing evidence or materials abroad. Where approval is legally required, the relevant procedures must be followed first. In practice, this makes it extremely difficult for foreign governments to obtain data from Chinese firms — a point illustrated by China’s recent first finding of improper foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Nuctech case. 5. Article 32 extends these rules to investments in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan unless separate rules apply. This means the new outbound investment controls also affect the Hong Kong market, potentially dealing another blow to Hong Kong’s role as an international financial center. Overall, the new regulations mark another major step in China’s tightening control over cross-border capital flows, technology transfer, and overseas economic activity. It is becoming increasingly difficult for Chinese investors to invest abroad independently of state oversight. The move also suggests growing concern in Beijing over capital outflows and pressure on China’s foreign exchange reserves. news.cn/20260601/e39cc163c50…

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If everything is critical, nothing is. @EyckFreymann, @HugoBromley, and @KS_1013 offer a four-layer rubric that allied policymakers can use to systematically identify which economic dependencies on China actually warrant intervention and which can wait. hoover.org/research/critical…

“Every time Xi tests Taiwan without consequence, and every time the United States reveals its lack of stomach for economic pain, the more emboldened Xi will feel to push harder,” warns @eyckfreymann. foreignaffairs.com/china/rea…

“The concentration of global trade and energy flows through a handful of narrow routes has magnified the impact of localized crises.” Read @LynnKuok on the broader implications of the chaos in the Strait of Hormuz. foreignaffairs.com/china/hor…

Just because it's a bad idea doesn't mean they won't try to do it.

The CDU has four months to think very hard about how its "incompatibility resolutions" against working with both the AfD and Die Linke are going to survive the coming electoral shitshow in Saxony-Anhalt.

A new @PIIE paper by @shoumitro_c & me on the “China Squeeze” on poor countries: piie.com/publications/workin… Puzzle: not why China is so competitive in EVs, solar panels, batteries & hi-tech. goods (China Shock 2.0) but why it continues to dominate low skill exports 1/

Fascinating discussion with @RobinNiblett on #UK foreign policy and the leadership of #keirstarmer. Our talk covered a wide range of topics, including UK relations with the #US #China #Europe and #Asia and the different position of UK political parties. podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcas…

whenever things go bad, Keynes idea of bancor & the high expectation on the quasi-bancor ie SDR comes back; how many cycles do we need to bear until it finally works? ft.com/content/193eebad-3a12…

This is a brilliant metaphor from Harvard professor Joshua Greene on why grade inflation is so harmful. theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/0…

1/10 The post-Draghi hope was that Putin would supply the urgency to make the reforms to push innovation, single market and competitiveness that Europe lacks. The data does not support that. A thread. siliconcontinent.com/p/the-t…

Hard to beat Peter Harrell's take on the Court of International Trade's ruling on the section 122 tariffs -- 1/ a few

This is technically true but misleading. US production of liquids is higher than overall consumption, *but* consumption hinges on inputs (particularly heavier crude blends) that can only be sourced abroad. Production is weighted toward LPGs, which the US produces far in excess of domestic demand.

“For the first time since the conflict began, Russians are starting to imagine a future without [Vladimir Putin],” writes a former senior Russian government official in a guest essay. “This is down to a confluence of four factors” economist.com/by-invitation/…

Some may feel I’m dwelling on this, but I am concerned for the health of the UK economy. The yield on the 10-year gilt has climbed 12 basis points today (see the CNBC chart below), decoupling from both oil prices and yields in other advanced economies—both of which are currently lower. Meanwhile, the 30-year yield has just hit a 28-year high. #economy #markets #gilts #uk