💣 In December 1964, a senior U.S. Defense Department official wrote a secret memo titled The Indian Nuclear Problem. One key assessment was stark: “One consequence of an Indian program is that one more national state, India, could some day be able to attack the United States with nuclear weapons.” Source: Declassified DoD memo by Henry S. Rowen, 24 December 1964
nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NS… 1/7 @RadioactiveFrnd @CISS_Islamabad @ciss_ajk @CISSS_Karachi @bttn_quetta @SVI_Pakistan @IDSAIndia @orfonline @TahirAndrabi

💣 In December 1964, a senior U.S. Defense Department official wrote a secret memo titled The Indian Nuclear Problem. One key assessment was stark: “One consequence of an Indian program is that one more national state, India, could some day be able to attack the United States with nuclear weapons.” Source: Declassified DoD memo by Henry S. Rowen, 24 December 1964
nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NS… 1/7 @RadioactiveFrnd @CISS_Islamabad @ciss_ajk @CISSS_Karachi @bttn_quetta @SVI_Pakistan @IDSAIndia @orfonline @TahirAndrabi

“The absence of #Nuclear threats must never be mistaken for the absence of #Deterrence. The fact that escalation was avoided proves that deterrence operated. It does not prove that #NuclearRisk was marginal.” — Brig Dr Zahir Kazmi (R), #CISS Seminar on #YoumeTakbeer2026

At CISS today, my message was clear: Chaghai gave Pakistan strategic autonomy; Full Spectrum Deterrence preserved it against evolving threats; Marka-e-Haq demonstrated it under pressure. Pakistan PaindabadPakistan’s deterrence works — nuclear deterrence held the strategic ceiling, conventional deterrence restored balance below it, and political control preserved escalation discipline. Those who read restraint as weakness, ambiguity as incoherence, or deterrence success as bluff are not offering analysis; they are creating escalation hazards. There is no viable space for war in South Asia.

Indian leaders have historically made numerous formal statements acknowledging Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory, emphasizing that its final status must be determined by the will of its people through a referendum or plebiscite under international auspices. 1. October 27–November 2, 1947: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sent telegrams and made a radio broadcast stating that the accession was subject to a decision by the people of the state. 2. November 21–25, 1947: Nehru reaffirmed in communications and before the Indian Constituent Assembly that the accession should be decided via a plebiscite under UN supervision. 3. 1948–1955: India referred the Kashmir issue to the UN and accepted UNCIP resolutions promising a plebiscite. Prime Minister Nehru frequently reiterated this commitment in Parliament. 4. 1953–1972: Following joint communiqués in 1953, the 1966 Tashkent Declaration and 1972 Simla Agreement saw India agree to address the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. 5. 1999: The Lahore Declaration, signed by Prime Minister Vajpayee, reaffirmed the commitment to resolving the Kashmir issue. 6. Pakistan-India, Composite Dialogue (1998-2013): An exclusive dialogue on resolutions of Kashmir dispute. Therefore, the objection of Indian govt on the mutual statement of EU & Pakistan is illogical. Especially when Modi himself brought Kashmir at the centre stage of international peace and security.

The #ministry of external affairs strongly rejected references to #JammuandKashmir in a joint statement issued by the #EuropeanUnion and #Pakistan, calling them unwarranted.Responding to media queries, MEA spokesperson #RandhirJaiswal said India "categorically rejects" any mention of Jammu and Kashmir in the joint press communiqué. Know more 🔗 toi.in/CDqFrY17