Filter
Exclude
Time range
-
Near
Secure your embedded designs for evolving threats with dsPIC33 Digital Signal Controllers (DSCs). Explore security solutions that support reliable Live Update, post-quantum cryptography readiness and protection for connected real-time control applications. Learn more: mchp.us/3RWXyhu. #EmbeddedSecurity #PQC #LiveUpdate
7
528
๐ŸชŸ CVE-2026-46293 is why โ€œkernel panicโ€ isnโ€™t a vibeโ€”itโ€™s a spectrum. Out-of-bounds in a clock driver might be niche, but it screams: regressions everywhere, patch responsibly. #WindowsForum #Microsoft #Linux #CVE windowsforum.com/threads/cveโ€ฆ #LinuxKernel #Cve #EmbeddedSecurity
46
๐Ÿ‡ผโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ฆโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ณโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ณโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ฆโ€‹ โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ญโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ฆโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡จโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ฐโ€‹โ€‹ โ€‹๐Ÿ‡นโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ญโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ชโ€‹ โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ตโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ฑโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ฆโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ณโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡ชโ€‹โ€‹๐Ÿ‡นโ€‹โ“ Checkout #WHIDBOARD ๐Ÿ‘‡๐Ÿ‘‡๐Ÿ‘‡ lab401.com/products/whidboarโ€ฆ #HardwareHacking #IoTSecurity #EmbeddedSecurity #HardwareForensics #OffensiveHardwareSecurity #CertifiedHardwareHacker
2
2
364
Reverse Engineering Tools(part2) 1 Dumpulator Mandiant tool for emulating code from process dumps without running the full binary. Emulates only the target function from a crash dump โ€” ideal for vulnerability analysis without deploying a malicious environment. 2 de4dot-cex Fork of de4dot with support for modern .NET obfuscators (ConfuserEx, .NET Reactor, SmartAssembly, etc.). Automatically strips protection before decompilation, restoring original logic even in heavily obfuscated assemblies. 3 Emux Emulator for rare architectures (TMS320, NEC V850, Renesas RL78). Lets you run and analyze embedded device firmware without physical hardware. Essential for pentesting industrial controllers and IoT 4 FirmWire Full-system emulation platform for modem firmware (LTE/5G) and base stations. Enables fuzzing radio protocols, debugging firmware at the physical layer, and discovering telecom vulnerabilities 5 Triton Framework for dynamic symbolic execution (DSE) and taint analysis. Used for automatically building data-flow graphs, deobfuscation, and generating exploits for non-standard architectures 6 Netconstructor Framework for reverse engineering binary protocols. Combines static traffic analysis with dynamic WinAPI call interception helps reconstruct packet structures of closed-source applications Pro tip: Always analyze unknown binaries in an isolated VM with snapshot capability. One misstep can compromise your host system. Stay safe, stay curious #InfoSec #CyberSecurity #ReverseEngineering #MalwareAnalysis #FirmwareRE #EmbeddedSecurity #EthicalHacking #SecurityResearch #MrRobot #CyberSec #Reverse #Analysis #Tools
7
12
99
3,084
Hacking HDD Firmware: A Reverse Engineering Journey Working on an Xbox 360 race-condition exploit, I needed to modify HDD firmware to add read delays. Here's what I learned dumping & patching drives from WD, Samsung & Hitachi The Process: Dump firmware Found WD dump via HDD Guru forums; Samsung PM871a firmware updater on Lenovo's site Analyze in IDA WD used modified LZHUF compression; Samsung used simple nibble obfuscation (reversed from updater) Find the read handler Traced VSC (Vendor Specific Commands) via JTAG debugging to locate DMA READ EXT processing Patch & test Injected ~200ms delay into read loop; actual delay ~450ms (close enough for PoC) Key Discoveries: โ€ข WD drives store code in overlay modules on the platters' service area not just in SPI flash โ€ข JTAG debugging on live HDDs is possible (but fragile Windows timeouts are brutal) โ€ข VSC command tables can be mapped by poisoning memory breakpoints โ€ข Some Samsung firmware uses unknown ISAs โ€” saved for Part 2 with AI-assisted RE The Twist: After weeks of firmware hackingโ€ฆ the Xbox 360 exploit started working *without* any HDD mods. The race condition resolved itself through other timing variables. Mission accomplished, but the firmware RE skills stay Tools Released: IDA loader plugins, firmware unpackers, VSC command scripts all open-sourced on GitHub. Hope this helps others dive into embedded RE #FirmwareHacking #ReverseEngineering #InfoSec #EmbeddedSecurity #Xbox360 #HardDrive #WD #Samsung #JTAG #IDAPro #CyberSecurity #EthicalHacking #ExploitDev #OpenSource #TechResearch
6
11
41
1,641
ZANCUDO and the Future of Practical IoT Security Testing IoT security work often exposes a hard truth: the protocols that power connected devices do not always have the same mature testing ecosystem we rely on in web application security. MQTT is a clear example. It is widely used, efficient, and well suited for embedded environments, yet deep inspection and manipulation of MQTT traffic can still require too much manual effort. That is why VerSprite open sourced ZANCUDO. Built from real world engagement experience, ZANCUDO gives security testers a more practical way to intercept, inspect, decode, and manipulate MQTT traffic during IoT and embedded device assessments. What makes this important: โ€ข MQTT security testing needs purpose built tooling Testing IoT devices is not just web testing with a different protocol. Embedded systems often introduce custom certificate chains, proprietary payload formats, constrained environments, and device specific trust assumptions. โ€ข Visibility is foundational to risk discovery ZANCUDO helps transform opaque MQTT payloads into readable intelligence by supporting common text and binary formats such as JSON, XML, YAML, JWT, Protobuf, BSON, MessagePack, CBOR, and more. โ€ข Certificate based controls still need to be tested realistically With its gen_certs utility, ZANCUDO supports TLS MITM workflows by helping testers generate proxy certificates and mimic certificate authority behavior in controlled assessment conditions. โ€ข Scriptability turns observation into validation Through JavaScript based logic, testers can analyze custom payload formats, decrypt proprietary message structures when authorized, modify packets, drop traffic, and test authorization boundaries with precision. โ€ข Open source raises the standard for the security community Tools born in the field often solve the problems practitioners actually face. By releasing ZANCUDO, VerSprite is contributing not only code, but operational knowledge shaped by hands on AppSec and IoT security research. At VerSprite, this reflects how we approach cybersecurity: understand the system, model the threat, test with discipline, and share meaningful capability back with the community. ZANCUDO is more than a proxy. It is a reminder that strong security research should make complex testing more accessible, repeatable, and useful for defenders, builders, and breakers alike. Read the full blog and explore the project here: hubs.la/Q04hVGTr0 #ApplicationSecurity #IoTSecurity #CybersecurityResearch #PenetrationTesting #EmbeddedSecurity #MQTT #OpenSourceSecurity #ThreatModeling #AppSec #VerSprite
3
6
89
โš™๏ธ Embedded Systems Vulnerability Research โ€” One of the Best Curated Resources for IoT & Hardware Hacking This repository is basically a roadmap for learning: ๐Ÿ” Firmware Reverse Engineering ๐Ÿ“ก IoT Exploitation ๐Ÿง  ARM/MIPS Internals โšก Hardware Debugging ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ Bootloader & UART Attacks ๐Ÿ”ฅ Router / Camera / Smart Device Exploitation ๐ŸŽฏ Fault Injection & Glitching ๐Ÿš— Automotive & CAN Bus Research ๐Ÿ“ฆ Firmware Emulation & Fuzzing Includes: ๐Ÿ“š Books ๐ŸŽฅ Conference talks ๐Ÿงช Labs & vulnerable targets ๐Ÿงฐ Tools like Ghidra, QEMU, AFL , Qiling, Binwalk ๐Ÿ“ Hundreds of real-world writeups & research blogs If you want to move beyond web bug bounty and understand real device exploitation, firmware analysis, and embedded attack surfaces โ€” this is gold. Most people stop at web apps. Very few understand how routers, cameras, smart TVs, IoT devices, payment terminals, or automotive systems actually get hacked. That gap is a massive opportunity. ๐Ÿ”— github.com/IamAlch3mist/Awesโ€ฆ #CyberSecurity #IoT #EmbeddedSecurity #Firmware #ReverseEngineering
9
55
1,878
ZANCUDO Advances the Standard for MQTT Security Testing Modern IoT environments depend on communication patterns that are often difficult to assess with conventional application security tools. MQTT sits at the center of many connected ecosystems, carrying telemetry, commands, device state, identity signals, and backend interactions. When that traffic is protected by TLS, encoded in proprietary formats, or shaped by device specific logic, security testing requires more than visibility. It requires controlled interception, interpretation, and manipulation. ZANCUDO was built for that reality. VerSprite created ZANCUDO as an open source MQTT interception proxy for IoT and embedded device pentesting. It gives practitioners a practical way to evaluate MQTT based communication flows with the depth these environments demand. The value is in making complex testing workflows more repeatable. ZANCUDO helps security teams: โ€ข Inspect MQTT traffic in authorized assessment environments โ€ข Support TLS MITM testing through certificate generation โ€ข Decode structured and binary payload formats โ€ข Analyze and manipulate messages with JavaScript based scripting โ€ข Validate device and backend trust assumptions through controlled traffic modification This is the kind of contribution that reflects VerSpriteโ€™s role in the cybersecurity field. Our research is shaped by hands on security work, but it is not limited to private findings or isolated engagements. When we identify a recurring challenge that affects practitioners, product teams, and the broader ecosystem, we look for ways to turn that insight into capability. ZANCUDO is one example of that mindset. It gives IoT security teams a focused tool for MQTT analysis while reinforcing a larger principle: effective security testing must meet systems where they actually operate. For connected products, that means understanding the protocols, payloads, certificates, trust models, and behavioral logic that define real world risk. Explore ZANCUDO: hubs.ly/Q04gBwFl0 #IoTSecurity #Cybersecurity #ApplicationSecurity #MQTT #EmbeddedSecurity #SecurityResearch #PenetrationTesting #OpenSourceSecurity #VerSprite
2
3
47
Prepare systems for the post-quantum transition with hardware-based security. The TS1800 and TS50x Root of Trust controllers support PQC-ready secure boot and lifecycle management to address emerging security mandates. Learn more: mchp.us/4tvNGZ9. #EmbeddedSecurity #PQC
2
9
546
Industrial devices typically operate for 10, or even up to 20 years once deployed on the line. However, the upcoming EU CRA now demands manufacturers guarantee secure updates for at least 5 years or more. The reality is that industrial equipment was never designed with "long-term security operations" in mind. Devices run for a decade with their security levels completely frozen at the exact state they were shipped. This is an industry-wide structural limitation: โ€ข Lack of OTA Infrastructure: Only a fraction of devices can receive remote patches. โ€ข Poor SBOM Management: A total lack of visibility into underlying firmware components. โ€ข Low-Spec Constraints: Insufficient system resources to run standard security agents. โ€ข Manual USB Patching: Relying on in-person engineer visits for updates. โ€ข Unpatchable Legacy Equipment: The most critical unresolved blind spot. A component supplier's consulting report can only tell you "what to do". But the EU CRA ultimately asks one critical question: "How will you guarantee secure security updates for the next 5 years, including for devices you have already sold?" Answering "how to securely operate it for 5 years" can only be guaranteed by technical mechanisms embedded directly into the product itself. Peanut AI is purpose-built to fill this exact void by embedding "long-term operability" directly into the product. โ€ข ModOn-I (Device Agent): A lightweight agent installed directly inside low-spec industrial devices without requiring hardware replacements. โ€ข Legacy Coverage: Extends to already-shipped field equipment, resolving the retroactive reporting obligations of Article 69(3). โ€ข Secure OTA: Transitions manual USB patching into a 5 year remote operational framework. On top of the areas covered by standard component consulting, manufacturers must add Device-Level Embedded Security to fully complete the EU CRAโ€™s 5-year liability requirements. #EUCRA #IndustrialSecurity #OTSecurity #SBOM #LegacyDevices #EmbeddedSecurity #PeanutAI
2
25
์‚ฐ์—…๊ธฐ๊ธฐ๋Š” "์žฅ๊ธฐ ์šด์˜"์„ ์ „์ œ๋กœ ์„ค๊ณ„๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ๋ฐ EU CRA๋Š” 5๋…„์„ ์š”๊ตฌํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์‚ฐ์—…๊ธฐ๊ธฐ๋Š” ํ•œ ๋ฒˆ ๋ผ์ธ์— ์„ค์น˜๋˜๋ฉด 10๋…„, ๊ธธ๊ฒŒ๋Š” 20๋…„ ์ด์ƒ ๊ฐ€๋™๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ์ผ๋ฐ˜์ ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ๋‹ค๊ฐ€์˜ค๋Š” EU CRA(์‚ฌ์ด๋ฒ„๋ณต์›๋ ฅ๋ฒ•)๋Š” ํ–ฅํ›„ ์ตœ์†Œ 5๋…„ ์ด์ƒ์˜ '์•ˆ์ „ํ•œ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์—…๋ฐ์ดํŠธ ๋ณด์žฅ'์„ ์™„์ œํ’ˆ ์ œ์กฐ์‚ฌ์— ์š”๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋”œ๋ ˆ๋งˆ์˜ ์‹œ์ž‘์€ ์‚ฐ์—… ์ „์ฒด์˜ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์  ํ•œ๊ณ„์—์„œ ๋น„๋กฏ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ํ˜„์‹ค์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์˜ ์‚ฐ์—…๊ธฐ๊ธฐ๋Š” ์• ์ดˆ์— '์žฅ๊ธฐ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์šด์˜'์„ ์ „์ œ๋กœ ์„ค๊ณ„๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ถœํ•˜ ์‹œ์ ์˜ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์ˆ˜์ค€์ด ๊ทธ๋Œ€๋กœ ๋™๊ฒฐ๋œ ์ฑ„ ๊ฐ€๋™๋  ์ˆ˜๋ฐ–์— ์—†๋Š” ๊ตฌ์กฐ์  ํ•œ๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ์กด์žฌํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Š” ๋‹จ์ผ ๊ธฐ์—…์˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์•„๋‹™๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. โ€ข ์›๊ฒฉ ํŒจ์น˜๊ฐ€ ๋ถˆ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ OTA ์ฒด๊ณ„ ๋ถ€์กฑ โ€ข ํŽŒ์›จ์–ด ๋‚ด๋ถ€ ์ปดํฌ๋„ŒํŠธ๋ฅผ ํŒŒ์•…ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋Š” SBOM ๊ด€๋ฆฌ ๋ฏธํก โ€ข ๋ณด์•ˆ ์ž์›์ด ํ„ฑ์—†์ด ๋ถ€์กฑํ•œ ์ €์‚ฌ์–‘ ๋””๋ฐ”์ด์Šค ํ™˜๊ฒฝ โ€ข ์—”์ง€๋‹ˆ์–ด๊ฐ€ ์ง์ ‘ ํ˜„์žฅ์„ ๋ฐฉ๋ฌธํ•ด์•ผ ํ•˜๋Š” USB ์ˆ˜๋™ ํŒจ์น˜ โ€ข ๋ฌด์—‡๋ณด๋‹ค, ์ด๋ฏธ ์ถœํ•˜๋œ ๋ ˆ๊ฑฐ์‹œ ์žฅ๋น„์˜ ์›๊ฒฉ ํŒจ์น˜ ๋ถˆ๊ฐ€ ๋ถ€ํ’ˆ์‚ฌ์˜ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์ปจ์„คํŒ… ๋ฆฌํฌํŠธ๋Š” "๋ฌด์—‡์„ ํ•ด์•ผ ํ•˜๋Š”๊ฐ€"์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋‹ต๋งŒ ์ค„ ๋ฟ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ •์ž‘ EU CRA Article 13์ด ๋ฌป๋Š” ๋‹จ ํ•˜๋‚˜์˜ ์งˆ๋ฌธ์€, "์ด๋ฏธ ํŒ๋งคํ•œ ์žฅ๋น„๋ฅผ ํฌํ•จํ•ด, ํ–ฅํ›„ 5๋…„ ์ด์ƒ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ์•ˆ์ „ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์—…๋ฐ์ดํŠธ๋ฅผ ๋ณด์žฅํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ธ๊ฐ€?" ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. "5๋…„๊ฐ„ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ์šด์˜ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ธ๊ฐ€"๋Š” ์™„์ œํ’ˆ ์ž์ฒด์— ์‹ฌ์–ด๋‘” ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์  ๋ฉ”์ปค๋‹ˆ์ฆ˜์œผ๋กœ๋งŒ ๋ณด์žฅํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. Peanut AI๋Š” ์™„์ œํ’ˆ ์•ˆ์— '์žฅ๊ธฐ ์šด์˜'์˜ ๋ฉ”์ปค๋‹ˆ์ฆ˜์„ ์ง์ ‘ ์‹ฌ์–ด ์ œ์กฐ์‚ฌ์˜ ๋นˆ์ž๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ํ•ด๊ฒฐํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. โ€ข ModOn-I (Device Agent): ํ•˜๋“œ์›จ์–ด ๊ต์ฒด ์—†์ด ๋””๋ฐ”์ด์Šค ๋‚ด๋ถ€์— ์ง์ ‘ ์„ค์น˜๋˜๋Š” ์ดˆ๊ฒฝ๋Ÿ‰ ์—์ด์ „ํŠธ โ€ข Legacy Coverage: ์ด๋ฏธ ์ถœํ•˜๋œ ํ˜„์žฅ ์žฅ๋น„์—๋„ ๋™์ผํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์ ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ Article 69(3)์˜ ์†Œ๊ธ‰ ๋ณด๊ณ  ์˜๋ฌด๊นŒ์ง€ ์™„๋ฒฝํžˆ ์ปค๋ฒ„ โ€ข Secure OTA: ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ USB ์ˆ˜๋™ ํŒจ์น˜๋ฅผ 5๋…„ ์ด์ƒ์˜ ์›๊ฒฉ ๋ณด์•ˆ ๋ผ์ดํ”„์‚ฌ์ดํด ์šด์˜์œผ๋กœ ์ „ํ™˜ ๊ธฐ์กด ๋ถ€ํ’ˆ์‚ฌ์˜ ์ปจ์„คํŒ… ์˜์—ญ ์œ„์— 'Device-Level Embedded Security'๋ฅผ ๋”ํ•ด์•ผ๋งŒ ์™„์ œํ’ˆ ์ œ์กฐ์‚ฌ์˜ EU CRA 5๋…„ ์ฑ…์ž„ ์š”๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์™„๋ฒฝํžˆ ์ถฉ์กฑํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. #EUCRA #IndustrialSecurity #OTSecurity #SBOM #LegacyDevices #EmbeddedSecurity #PeanutAI
2
26
๐Ÿšจ ๐‘๐ž๐š๐๐ฒ ๐ญ๐จ ๐ฅ๐ž๐ฏ๐ž๐ฅ ๐ฎ๐ฉ ๐ฒ๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ ๐œ๐ฒ๐›๐ž๐ซ๐ฌ๐ž๐œ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐ฌ๐ค๐ข๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฌ? ๐Ÿšจ ๐Ÿ”ฅ ๐”๐ฌ๐ž ๐œ๐จ๐๐ž ๐’๐ฎ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐ž๐ซ๐ˆ๐ฌ๐‚๐จ๐ฆ๐ข๐ง๐  ๐ญ๐จ ๐ ๐ž๐ญ ๐Ÿ‘๐ŸŽ% ๐Ž๐…๐… ๐Ÿ“… ๐•๐š๐ฅ๐ข๐ ๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ๐ข๐ฅ ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ/๐Ÿ” โšก#HandsOnLabs โ€ข #HardwareHacking โ€ข #EmbeddedSecurity โ€ข #CertifiedHardwareHacker โšก๐Ÿ”“
1
3
5
375
May 14
How to reverse engineer and get full root access on a TP-Link Tapo C200 (@qkaiser) quentinkaiser.be/security/20โ€ฆ #infosec #iot #embeddedsecurity
1
54
383
15,407
One week out. Most professionals treating Secure Boot as a binary answer have not read the sequence carefully enough. The platform does not simply โ€œenableโ€ or โ€œdisableโ€ trust. It transfers trust between stages: UEFI โ†’ shim โ†’ GRUB โ†’ kernel โ†’ initramfs โ†’ runtime Each stage inherits assumptions from the previous one. That transfer is not purely cryptographic. It is operational. And operational trust creates policy surfaces. On May 18 I am running a 4-hour live masterclass on TrainSec focused entirely on operational Secure Boot assessment methodology. Terminal only. No firmware dumping. No kernel exploit. No fault injection. No binary patching. No โ€œmagic hacker tricksโ€. Only evidence-driven trust reconstruction using: โ€ข GRUB interaction โ€ข kernel cmdline analysis โ€ข dmesg telemetry โ€ข /proc and /sys โ€ข initramfs traces โ€ข recovery workflows โ€ข trusted operational behavior The goal is not to โ€œbreak Secure Bootโ€. The goal is to understand how a system can: โ€ข validate signatures correctly โ€ข boot exactly as designed โ€ข enforce Secure Boot correctly โ€ข and still expose exploitable operational trust transitions The session was designed for: โ€ข Security architects โ€ข Product security teams โ€ข Secure Boot implementers โ€ข R&D leaders โ€ข Platform engineers โ€ข Embedded/Linux developers โ€ข Red teams and assessors โ€ข AI/edge platform security engineers The webinar includes a downloadable Secure Boot Challenge Lab VM built specifically for this methodology: QEMU โ†’ OVMF โ†’ signed Ubuntu Secure Boot chain โ†’ initramfs orchestration Over 4 hours we reconstruct the trust chain, map operational boundaries, enumerate recovery surfaces, recover trusted workflows, and drive the analysis all the way to privileged execution and protected payload replay. $49 per seat. Every registrant receives a matching $49 TrainSec course voucher. Recording included. Seats are disappearing much faster than expected. Registration: trainsec.net/bypassing-securโ€ฆ #CyberSecurity #SecureBoot #LinuxSecurity #EmbeddedSecurity #PlatformSecurity #ProductSecurity #SecurityArchitecture #ThreatModeling #RedTeam #SecurityAssessment #FirmwareSecurity #UEFI #Linux #Initramfs #KernelSecurity #AIInfrastructure #EdgeComputing #OffensiveSecurity #CyberResearch #TrainSec
2
5
1,317
Open Source IoT Security Needs Practical Tools IoT security testing often reveals a tooling gap. While HTTP testing has mature interception workflows, MQTT based systems can still require custom scripts, manual traffic analysis, and significant setup just to gain visibility. That is why VerSprite built ZANCUDO, an open source MQTT interception proxy for IoT pentesting. Read the full post: versprite.com/blog/zancudo-oโ€ฆ ZANCUDO reflects how VerSprite approaches security research: solve real problems from real engagements, then contribute practical capability back to the community. Key takeaways: โ€ข MQTT security testing requires protocol native tooling โ€ข Visibility into device traffic is essential for meaningful assessment โ€ข Packet modification, injection, and filtering are critical for testing real risk โ€ข Open source tools help raise the baseline for IoT and embedded security ZANCUDO was born from field work involving TLS, client certificates, custom CAs, and proprietary encryption. It is a practical example of research shaped by real world application security challenges. Explore the full writeup: versprite.com/blog/zancudo-oโ€ฆ #ApplicationSecurity #IoTSecurity #Cybersecurity #OffensiveSecurity #PenetrationTesting #SecurityResearch #OpenSourceSecurity #MQTT #EmbeddedSecurity
3
3
48
Stop treating security as an afterthought. See how our IEC 62443-4-1 ML2 certification shows Microchip embeds cybersecurity across the product lifecycle. Read the blog for details: mchp.us/4sJ3qrr. #Cybersecurity #EmbeddedSecurity #CyberResilience
1
3
4
1,059
ZANCUDO and the Practical Future of IoT Security Testing IoT security testing has a visibility problem. In traditional web application security, interception, inspection, and manipulation are expected parts of the assessment workflow. In IoT and embedded environments, that same level of control is often harder to achieve. MQTT traffic, certificate based trust models, proprietary payload formats, and device specific constraints can turn a security assessment into a collection of manual workarounds. That gap is why VerSprite built ZANCUDO. ZANCUDO is an open source MQTT interception proxy created from real engagement experience. It reflects a core VerSprite belief: meaningful security research should not stop at identifying technical friction. It should turn that friction into repeatable methods that help the broader security community test better. What makes ZANCUDO valuable for IoT pentesting: โ€ข It helps testers intercept MQTT traffic in environments where TLS and custom certificate chains are part of the trust model โ€ข It includes gen_certs, a utility designed to simplify certificate generation for authorized MITM testing โ€ข It turns raw MQTT payloads into more readable intelligence by decoding common formats such as JSON, XML, YAML, JWT, Protobuf, BSON, MessagePack, CBOR, and more โ€ข It supports JavaScript scripting so testers can analyze proprietary payload formats, modify packets, drop traffic, or test authorization assumptions in real time โ€ข It gives practitioners a structured way to move from observation to validation, which is where real security testing happens The larger lesson is not just about MQTT. As connected devices become more embedded in business operations, healthcare, industrial environments, consumer platforms, and critical infrastructure, security teams need tooling that understands the protocols those systems actually use. IoT risk cannot be evaluated only through web assumptions. It requires purpose built research, protocol fluency, and the ability to model how real devices communicate under real constraints. ZANCUDO represents that VerSprite contribution: field tested security research translated into open source capability. Explore ZANCUDO here: versprite.com/security-resouโ€ฆ #IoTSecurity #ApplicationSecurity #Cybersecurity #PenetrationTesting #MQTT #EmbeddedSecurity
3
3
50
Secure your designs against quantum computer threat with dsPIC33 DSCs and Microchipโ€™s free Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) library. The library supports NIST recommended CSNA 2.0 PQC algorithms and is optimized for dsPIC33 DSCs. mchp.us/426mpky #Microcontrollers #EmbeddedSystems #EmbeddedSecurity
1
4
12
935
Vehicle Hacking Arsenal โ€” From CAN Bus to Full Car Compromise ๐Ÿš—๐Ÿ”ง awesome-vehicle-security is a curated collection of real resources for automotive security research. โ€ข Covers CAN Bus, ECU, infotainment, telematics attack surfaces โ€ข Includes real-world exploits (Jeep hack, Tesla research, remote RCE cases) โ€ข Tools, hardware, and frameworks for car hacking reverse engineering โ€ข Research papers, talks, and courses โ†’ complete learning path Modern vehicles = connected systems โ†’ large attack surface. If youโ€™re serious about automotive security or embedded exploitation, this is a solid starting point. github.com/jaredthecoder/aweโ€ฆ #AutomotiveSecurity #CarHacking #CANBus #CyberSecurity #EmbeddedSecurity
2
4
36
1,481
Embedded Hacking Arsenal โ€” From Firmware to Full Device Compromise ๐Ÿ”ง๐Ÿ”ฅ A no-BS resource dump for IoT / Embedded vulnerability research: โ€ข Firmware reversing, bootloader exploitation, hardware debugging โ€ข ARM / MIPS / U-Boot / QEMU / Ghidra workflows โ€ข Real-world RCE writeups, 0-day chains, Pwn2Own cases โ€ข Labs tools blogs โ†’ complete learning pipeline If you're serious about IoT / hardware hacking, this is a goldmine. Better than random YouTube content โ€” this is real research. github.com/IamAlch3mist/Awesโ€ฆ #IoTSecurity #EmbeddedSecurity #FirmwareAnalysis #ReverseEngineering #BugBounty #HardwareHacking
47
252
8,741