Just did a call with Tamay Besiroglu (
@tamaybes), co-founder of Epoch AI, about what he expects for the future of AI.
“I think 2035 or so might be my median for when we’ll have drop-in AI remote workers.”
“I think for 30% per year GDP growth we might see that in 2050, which would be roughly my median.”
Here’s our chat:
Which tasks will AI be able to do first?
One useful framing is to think about Moravec’s paradox, where tasks that seem easy for humans are hard for AI. Skills that are relatively new and have been optimized for much less by natural selection and have emerged fairly recently, and when they emerged, conferred smaller fitness gains to humans, those tasks are easier for AI systems to do. So this would be chess, go, math, advanced abstract reasoning, coding, even language to some extent. By contrast, things that have been selected for and optimized for by evolution for a very long timeframe, like sensorimotor skills like interacting with your environment, with your body, and using your senses to help you navigate your environment – basic locomotion, like balancing your body and being able to feed yourself, things like this. Those skills are harder to automate because our brains have very efficient kind of software for learning to do these tasks. AI systems will likely see, and to a large extent we do see, this divide along roughly these lines, where coding, math, chess, AI is getting pretty good, or in the case of chess and go, AI is better than the best humans. In the other bucket of things, like sensorimotor skills, AI is really quite bad and very inefficient, where you need way more data and compute and even different modalities.
This tells you which tasks will fall first. It doesn’t tell you when those tasks will fall.
When will AI be able to do those tasks?
I think what’s useful to think about timeframe is to just look for other similar tasks, how long did it take in terms of calendar time, or maybe in terms of compute scaling, to get from “we’re making progress on the task” to “we’re getting to average human” to “beating all humans”. And so with chess, it took from you know the 1970s, a lab at Northwestern was working on chess engines, and they matched club players, 1500-2000 Elo and below, and then Kasparov in 1997, so it took about 25-30 years to go from median human to beating all humans, to beating the best humans.
Now, the scaling up of compute has massively accelerated from what it was before, from doubling every two years, to doubling twice per year. And so I would expect that it would take 5 to 10 years for models that could do things as well as the median expert to beating all humans (at that task). So then I would predict, on the basis of that, that we get superhuman math reasoning, superhuman coding, roughly in 5 years or maybe a little longer than that.
Super-reasoners for these specific domains, we’re already seeing a lot of progress in math and coding, I expect that to fall in 5 to 10 years.
Do you expect drop-in remote workers by 2030?
I don’t expect drop-in remote workers on that timeframe. I expect superhuman coding abilities and math and other types of reasoning, and to some extent, other skills. I think that AIs might be better than humans at management skills before they’re able to be drop-in remote workers, just because managing a large organization is something that wasn’t very strongly selected for by evolution.
The really interesting thing is getting superhuman engineers and superhuman abstract reasoning. I predict that we get that first and also that we get that roughly on this 5 to 10 year timeframe.
I think eventually you also get drop-in remote workers, but that might take a little longer, because it would require doing a bunch more stuff than just abstract reasoning, like it would require interfacing with other people and building up this rapport, and being able to navigate some environment based on very little data in a way that might require very good spatial visual reasoning.
It’s a much broader set of things that you have to master. I think people will realize that “oh, actually software engineers don’t just write code” – there’s a lot of other things they do and those things will take slightly longer to automate.
By when do you think there’s a 50-50 chance of drop-in remote workers?
I think 2035 or so might be my median for when we’ll have drop-in AI remote workers.
You’ve mentioned that it’s unclear if remote work automation is enough for economic acceleration. Is robotics the missing piece there?
That’s right, robotics is. I do think you get a very substantial acceleration from drop-in remote work, because it’s maybe 1/4 of the total US economy, and on average, remote work is also higher compensation. So that means you might get on the order of trillions of dollars per year in additional economic output from automating remote work. So it could be really substantial rates of growth.
By when do you think that consumer-oriented humanoid robots would be good enough that wealthy households would pay to keep a robot after a free trial?
Initially they might keep it because it’s kind of cool, it’s a nice gadget, and it impresses my guests.
For pure utility value, I think that perhaps mid 2030s is the point at which that happens more regularly. It would be earlier if it was very specific robots, like specifically for laundry but it can’t cook your food. But for general household robotic systems, I think mid 2030s.
Do you expect relatively full employment through 2030-2035, with lots of job destruction, but also creation, because of human preference jobs, bullshit jobs, etc?
I think I’m very uncertain. I think the right attitude would be to have fairly wide confidence intervals about labor force participation over the next 10 years, and even wider over the next 20 years and so on. I don’t think it’s because people will continue working in bullshit jobs, I think that productivity will improve, so jobs will become on average, less bullshit. They will become more meaningful in terms of adding to our economy, because our technology improves over time, and especially as AI gets really good at R&D or technology improves, which enhances productivity, and our economy becomes larger, and we accumulate more capital, then there’s more capital per worker. And finally, humans will work on things that AI systems struggle at, and so we effectively complement them. Or we’re effectively complemented by these very powerful AI systems.
Then you get much more output, your marginal product of workers goes up, because the economy really really benefits from having humans do the things that AI systems can’t do, because we’re effectively bottlenecked on those tasks.
This is related to what you told me about even if the economy is 90% automated, the share of economic spend on labor could be much higher than 10%?
Yeah exactly. If you take current tasks and you automate 90% of those tasks, we could still have very high employment, because we could have all the human workers work on those remaining 10%, and those remaining 10% have now become very important, because they help us unlock the value of AI.
What’s your median prediction on when total global inference spend exceeds $70 trillion per year (i.e. approx current total labor spend)?
Yeah that’s a nice question. In my head I’m trying to project GDP over time, because that’s growing. I guess one question you could pose is, when is it going to exceed labor’s current share [i.e. labor is $70T, GWP about $105T, so when would it be >65-70% of global output], not just that dollar amount, but the actual fraction of output. That could never happen, it could remain below that because we get bottlenecked by other factors, and those shares grow as a fraction of total spend in our economy, maybe we spend more on land because we get bottlenecked by that or something. For that to happen, for inference spend to be 65-70% of the economy, that would happen when we automate basically all jobs.
When it reaches $70 trillion, this will be a much smaller fraction of our economy than $70 trillion is now, because our economy will grow.
My median for when inference spend exceeds $70 trillion per year, I guess I would say 2035 or something like that.
What’s your expectation for what total labor spend might be in 2035?
We grow maybe 5% per year for 10 years, I think it could be $130 trillion, perhaps more. I’m fairly uncertain, so I’d say $130 trillion with very wide confidence intervals, because of uncertainty about how much economic growth, uncertainty about job loss effects from AI automation.
By when do you think that AI will flexibly substitute for remote computer jobs? Is that the same as your 2035 answer for remote drop-in workers?
If it’s remote computer work, that would be different than all remote work. If you’re imagining perhaps IT support, I expect that to be sooner relative to all remote work. It could be 2030-2032, for AI to be able to flexibly substitute for all IT work that is currently being done remotely.
If AI can flexibly substitute for remote computer roles and also total labor spend will still be relatively large in 2035, is that due to relative advantage and complementarity?
It would be because I think AI systems will not be able to match the efficiency of humans at complex motor skills, visual motor skills, and in-person work. It might be quite good at things you can do remotely, but not things you need embodiment for, hands for.
Does that mean you expect a large amount of job displacement from very computer-based jobs towards jobs that are computer plus real-world hybrid and pure real-world jobs?
Yeah, that’s right, I do expect a shift towards that.
It sounds like explosive economic growth (i.e. GDP growth rate of 30% per year) is predicated on having enough pieces of the economy automated that you’re not bottlenecked by the remaining pieces. What’s your median for when we’ll see explosive economic growth?
I think for 30% per year GDP growth we might see that in 2050, which would be roughly my median.
Elon said “If you define AGI (artificial general intelligence) as smarter than the smartest human, I think it's probably next year [2025], within two years [by April 2026]” (April 2024) What’s the charitable interpretation where that’s true, and then how do you rate the literal interpretation?
Maybe the charitable interpretation is there’s some definition of smarter where this is true, something like more knowledgeable, more widely read, more capable of recalling a bunch of facts, faster at reading and maybe writing and context switching. So it’s definitely smarter in those dimensions, but obviously it’s not smarter in all dimensions. By 2026, Terence Tao will still be better at math than the best AI systems, very clearly. For the literal interpretation of there being no human that an AI does not pareto dominate, that’s going to turn out to be terribly wrong.
Do you expect inference costs to continue declining at the current rate?
GPT-4 was cents per 1000 tokens, and now we have Gemini 2.0 Flash or whatever it’s called, and it’s cents per million tokens. So there’s 3 OOMs of efficiency gains for roughly the same performance. So that’s 10x per year, 90% decline per year. This is not the same as saying we’re making an OOM per year of effective compute gains, because if you have 10x more compute, that compute might allow you to really push out the frontier. These specific innovations are more biased toward allowing you to obtain already attained capabilities but cheaper.
I do think we will continue seeing that type of innovation happen at a very fast pace, whether it’s as fast as we’ve seen it historically is a little uncertain. There might have been more low hanging fruit. But techniques like distillation and iterated amplification seem pretty powerful. Maybe you can’t really approximate the capabilities of very very good reasoning models in these tiny models, perhaps there’s some minimum circuit depth required to be able to approximate that. But I do expect the cost decline to be very fast, maybe as fast as we’ve seen historically, maybe slightly slower.
How would you advise your relatives to prepare for AI?
I would encourage them to save more and invest for precautionary reasons. It depends on how old the relatives are. But if you’re young that might mean what you thought would be this large amount of wealth that you could earn by selling your labor might disappear. So saving more for people in general, and especially for young people. For precautionary reasons, and also because the returns might be really great, so your investments might do especially well.
Also, stay healthy, because you might get to access really great technology in the future that you don’t want to miss out on, so be more risk-averse so that you’re more likely to enjoy the benefits of this technology and potentially longevity.
How do you think about capital allocation? Is it basically chips, data centers, energy infrastructure, generally the compute stack? Or more app layer? With the disclaimer of not financial advice.
I think it’s hard to pick winners, not financial advice, but I think more diversified portfolios are better. You might get the general sector right, like compute, but you might bet on the wrong player. You might want to make bets in such a way that really focuses on your disagreement with the market about AI. One way one might do this is buying very far out of the money call options on the S&P 500, which would materially appreciate if we see explosive growth, and the options are cheaper because the volatility for the S&P 500 is much lower than it would be for Nvidia. So maybe buy really cheap options that really highlight your disagreement between you and the market that’s specifically tied to AI rather than other things.
Do you expect millions of knowledge work jobs to be lost and recreated elsewhere?
Yeah, I do. I think that early job loss won’t translate to the same reduction in labor force participation, their jobs will be redefined, and they will do new tasks that they previously weren’t doing. Software engineers will spend more of their time instructing AI models and checking their work rather than writing code. And people will be able to find new tasks, especially if the economy is really booming and technology is improving. I don’t think very near term substantial job loss is something I would predict. In fact, you might even see people come out of unemployment because the wages are so good and the economy is booming, so you might see an increase in labor force participation. It depends a bit on the pace of automation, if we automate jobs faster than it takes time to retrain people for them, that might get you some friction, which would result in maybe a decrease in labor force participation.
It sounds like the overall picture is large job displacement in knowledge work, but lots of movement into other roles; drop-in remote worker products perhaps by 2035; and the prep advice is that you can’t necessarily rely on labor for income long term, so increase savings and invest broadly, don’t try and pick individual things unless you’re particularly well informed, and job-wise, assume that you’ll need to re-organize into something that is complementary to AI.
Yeah, that’s right. And, a person should have a lot of uncertainty, and they should plan for a pretty wide range of outcomes. I think that’s also a very important thing.