NetFlow-to-process attribution is coming in the next ServiceRadar release via the updated netprobe add-on: Rust, eBPF-backed socket/process attribution, AF_XDP flow capture, and upstream enrichment for process/container/workload context.

What I mean is that the last ~15-20 years have been an era where exploits that affect roughly the entire Internet have been historically rare/hard. But in the mid to late 90's, remote and LPE exploits against big commercial Unixes dropped on BUGTRAQ every few weeks, early 2000's for Windows were that way also. Situations like the above *caused* OpenBSD to exist, privsep to be implemented into those daemons, and custom hardening to be implemented at sites. It caused the Trustworthy Computing Initiative at Microsoft because the situation was so dire. Today, a vocal and influential plurality of professionals in the field advocate "just patch faster" or "just rewrite the world in Rust" as security strategies, which are both oblivious to the architectural security engineering lessons from that era of planning for and containing security faults and failures. If increasingly powerful AI models are bringing us to another era where impactful exploits are common and easy, then I believe that those strategies aren't the right ones for vast majority of organizations to prioritize. "Just patch faster" is oblivious to the latent vulnerabilities that are now significantly easier to exploit and it's a race that the attacker has an easier time winning than the defender. "Just rewrite in Rust" causes functionality and security logic bugs fixed decades ago to be reimplemented (see uutils/coreutils). Neither give the defender more leverage than architectural approaches, IMHO, for the simple reason that each additional security boundary requires the attacker to have another exploitable vulnerability, and the probability of them achieving their objectives is the arithmetic product of the probabilities of exploitable vulnerabilities existing in each security boundary along the minimum length attack path. Lengthening that path decreases the end-to-end probability the most and is in the control of both organizations that build and those that deploy systems.

bluesky has its moments ngl

was kubernetes invented or discovered

Putting outdated coding books in the Little Free Library should be considered illegal dumping, and carry a sentence of 100 hours community service.

I'm a software engineer with 50 years of experience. If you know how to steer an LLM properly, the frontier models are extremely good at generating code. They're weak at architecture, which is one of several reasons you want a human in the loop, but they can have a very low error rate compared to most humans. When they don't - when they generate slop - it's because you didn't know how to use the tool correctly.

Arrow tables have a clear anatomy: buffers → arrays → chunked arrays → table. Understanding this structure makes it obvious why columnar computation is fast you operate on contiguous memory per column.

What the hell

Working on new dashboards github.com/carverauto/servic…

Tim Apple has a last minute change of heart

Living with Alpha Gal Syndrome Alpha Gal syndrome is a new and emerging allergic condition that can have life-changing implications for ranchers and sportsman alike. When Joshua Hobbs, Montana coordinating wildlife biologist III for Pheasants Forever, contracted Alpha Gal Syndrome from a tick bite, it forced him to make some significant changes to his lifestyle. Visit the link below to learn more about Alpha Gal and Joshua's story. Stay safe out there folks! bit.ly/4sFSo61

"How do I capture value?" Versus "How do I create value?" Is the difference between a society of rent-seeking parasites and utopia.

Claude watching me write code by hand

Vercel finally learns what it feels like to be on the receiving end of an outrageous surprise bill.

This is the right assumption: assume that your adversaries *already* have exploits for vulnerabilities in software that you depend upon. The goal of security engineering is to proactively design your systems and environments to withstand security failures in that software.

This scene set unrealistic expectations of how I thought professionals would deal with each other in real life.

The internet doesn't forget @KimDotcom attrition.org/errata/charlat…

Should have done this a long time ago