Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5 🚨 AS A CARDANO DREP, I AM VOTING AGAINST REDUCING THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE MINIMUM FROM 7 TO 5
A proposal has been submitted to reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5.
This parameter defines the minimum number of Constitutional Committee members required for Cardano governance to function fully.
The current committee has 7 members, and the minimum threshold is also set at 7.
The authors argue that if one member resigns, becomes inactive, or reaches the end of their term, parts of Cardano governance could stop functioning.
This could affect:
• protocol parameter changes;
• Constitution updates;
• treasury withdrawals;
• hard forks;
• other governance actions requiring Constitutional Committee approval.
However, I believe lowering the minimum threshold is the wrong solution.
📌 If 7 members were elected, they should perform their duties
Constitutional Committee members were not elected simply to occupy seats.
They accepted responsibility for protecting and maintaining Cardano governance.
If one member resigns, becomes inactive, or reaches the end of their term, the correct solution is to replace that member in time.
The rules of the entire system should not be weakened because someone may fail to perform their duties.
📌 The problem is not the number 7 — the problem is governance organization
The system should:
• prepare replacements in advance;
• hold elections before current terms expire;
• create a reserve mechanism;
• register replacement members on-chain quickly;
• monitor committee participation and activity.
Reducing the threshold does not solve the real problem.
It simply allows the system to operate with fewer people.
📌 Today 7 becomes 5 — tomorrow 5 could become 3
The main danger is the precedent.
Today the argument is:
“We need to reduce the minimum from 7 to 5 for operational resilience.”
Tomorrow the same argument could be used again:
“We need to reduce it from 5 to 3 so governance does not stop.”
The current guardrails already allow the minimum committee size to be set between 3 and 10.
Therefore, reducing the threshold to 5 could become the first step toward further concentration of power.
📌 The smaller the committee, the greater the power of each individual member
With the current two-thirds threshold:
• 7 members require 5 Constitutional votes for approval;
• 6 members require 4 votes;
• 5 members require 4 votes.
With only 5 members, just 2 unconstitutional votes can prevent a governance action from reaching the required threshold.
This makes the committee more vulnerable to internal vetoes and concentration of influence.
This is not only a technical resilience issue.
It is also a question of power distribution inside Cardano governance.
📌 This does not directly reduce DRep power, but the indirect effect matters
The number of DReps does not change.
DRep voting power does not change.
DRep responsibilities formally remain the same.
However, after DReps vote, many governance actions still depend on Constitutional Committee approval.
The smaller the committee becomes, the more power each individual committee member gains over the wider ecosystem.
A broad DRep vote could therefore be blocked by a much smaller group of people.
📌 There is also a technical problem with this governance action
This proposal depends on another protocol parameter change related to the Plutus Cost Model ahead of the van Rossem hard fork.
Both governance actions use the same parent governance hash.
If the Plutus Cost Model proposal is enacted first, this committeeMinSize action may become invalid because the parent state will no longer be current.
In that case, the proposal would need to be submitted again with a new parent governance action ID.
This means the current vote may only record the position of DReps rather than produce an actual parameter change.
📌 My position
I vote NO.
My reasons are:
• the 7 elected members should fulfill their responsibilities;
• one resignation should not be used as a reason to weaken the rules;
• the real issue should be solved through replacement procedures, not by lowering the threshold;
• a smaller committee increases the influence of each member;
• 2 members could block decisions in a 5-member committee;
• this creates a precedent for reducing the minimum further to 3;
• broad DRep governance becomes more dependent on a narrow group;
• the proposal may become technically invalid because of the parent hash conflict.
Cardano is building decentralized governance.
Resilience should come from proper elections, timely replacement, accountability, and continuity — not from reducing the number of people responsible for constitutional oversight.
I have registered as a DRep and am ready to help shape the future of the ecosystem. I remain optimistic about building the largest digital community in the world. 🖤 My DRep ID: ➡️ drep1y269ehxj30k4vfzfc2z84v0xykd3amuy2xn0kv9zf8rhcec2fg2jr More details:
t.me/PROCENT666/338
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📌 Disclaimer: This post is for informational and analytical purposes only. It does not contain calls for action, protest, or violations of the law. All statements reflect the author’s personal analysis.
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