Senior Fellow @FDD | Former Treasury-OFAC Executive | USAF Veteran
Joined September 2022
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Apr 12
1/10 The U.S. naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would cost Iran approximately $276M/day in lost exports and disrupt $159M/day in imports, a combined economic damage of ~$435M/day, or $13B/month.
Over 90% of Iran's $109.7B in annual trade transits the Persian Gulf. Oil/gas accounts for 80% of government export earnings and 23.7% of GDP. Kharg Island alone generates ~$53B/year, or as I noted to @TIME, "$78 billion a year in energy revenue.
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"Oil sanctions waiver" for Iran in the MOU is most likely the same General License that @USTreasury issued on March 20, 2026, a narrow authorization covering crude already loaded on vessels.
Here are some details:
1/4 Don't expect this authorization to open a new market for Iranian oil. Iran's buyers aren't switching. China accounts for roughly 90% of Iran's oil exports, with independent "teapot" refineries in Shandong province absorbing the majority of that trade. These refiners already accept the sanctions risk. If anything, a temporary license gives them marginal cover — but once it lapses, they'll keep buying anyway. New Western buyers aren't coming, new Asian buyers highly unlikely.
Jun 12
🚨 I just spoke with a senior White House official (whom I trust 100%):
He laughed at how everyone who correctly points out that the Iranian regime lies about everything is suddenly believing what it publishes about the MOU, and losing their minds over it.
He shared the actual details of the deal with me, which are VERY DIFFERENT from what the regime is claiming:
🔸 ZERO CASH released to the regime. Some of the frozen funds will be unfrozen for humanitarian purchases only, and every single purchase must be approved by the US. He emphasized that all the money in the MOU is tied to Iran's actual nuclear concessions, not just for talking ("pay for performance," not "pay to play").
🔸 ZERO ENRICHED MATERIAL: Unlike what is being claimed, the US stance is that ALL enriched uranium (including all 60%, 20%, and 3.67% enriched material) will be taken out of Iran or diluted to make it unusable.
🔸 The only sanctions relief is a temporary 60-day window on oil sales, which will snap back into place at the end of the 60 days if no deal is reached.
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3/4 Here's the operational problem that gets little attention: after a general license expires or is revoked, enforcement becomes genuinely murky. GL U authorized oil loaded on or before March 20, 2026, for transactions through April 19, 2026. Once it expires, investigators face a months-long forensic puzzle — which shipments were loaded before the cutoff? Which cargoes were sold within the authorized window? Evasion networks exploit exactly this ambiguity. Revoking a general license doesn't flip a clean switch.
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4/4 Even if the administration wants to give broader oil sanctions relief, a stack of congressional statutes doesn't bend to a general license:
🔹 ISA (1996): Mandates sanctions on foreign investment in Iran's energy sector
🔹 CISADA (2010): Mandatory banking sanctions on FFIs facilitating transactions with designated Iranian banks; SWIFT access restrictions
🔹 NDAA §1245 (FY2012): Requires blocking/severe restrictions on FFIs conducting significant transactions with CBI for oil purchases
🔹 IFCA (2013, NDAA FY2013): Broad sanctions on Iran's energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors; sanctions on provision of insurance/reinsurance
🔹 Iran TRA (2012): Expands secondary sanctions, explicitly sanctions transportation of crude oil from Iran; penalizes U.S. parent companies for foreign subsidiary violations
🔹 SHIP Act (2024): Mandates sanctions on anyone who knowingly transports, refines, or conducts ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian-origin oil — no Iranian person involvement required; targets the goods, not just the actors
🔹 Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act (2024): Authorizes sanctions on Chinese financial institutions facilitating Iranian oil transactions, without a "significant transaction" threshold
None of these are waived by a GL U-style authorization. Any broader relief requires either presidential waiver authority exercised formally under each statute, or Congress. The financial chokehold on Iran's oil revenue stays in place regardless of what's signed in an MOU.
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Miad Maleki retweeted
This is undeniably true. But all the more reason President Trump must not squander the U.S. leverage he built by agreeing to a fatally-flawed negotiation process and deal.
Jun 12
Lost in the noise about deal terms, and the underappreciation of the current level of U.S. leverage, is the most important piece of context:
President Trump has achieved what 45 years of U.S. policy could not. The regime's military leadership is decimated, its economy is in freefall, and it is diplomatically isolated more than ever.
Just a couple years ago Iran was building drone manufacturing in the U.S. backyard, Venezuela.
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Miad Maleki retweeted
See our interactive to understand: most of Iran’s nuclear expansion occurred under the Biden administration, the patient pathways to nuclear weapons under the sunsetting Obama deal, and how U.S. and Israeli strikes have done severe damage to Iran’s enrichment program.👇
📈 NEW interactive from @StrickerNonpro and @mdubowitz: Track Iran's nuclear enrichment from the late 1990s through the 2025-2026 strikes that destroyed most of Tehran's program.
See how stockpiles grew across 4 administrations — and what the JCPOA would have allowed. fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/12/…
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Miad Maleki retweeted
13h
This should be obviously true but most of the establishment media in the U.S., Europe and Israel is dedicated to seeing only failure.
Jun 12
Lost in the noise about deal terms, and the underappreciation of the current level of U.S. leverage, is the most important piece of context:
President Trump has achieved what 45 years of U.S. policy could not. The regime's military leadership is decimated, its economy is in freefall, and it is diplomatically isolated more than ever.
Just a couple years ago Iran was building drone manufacturing in the U.S. backyard, Venezuela.
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Miad Maleki retweeted
The regime in Iran is acting like a reasonable party on the verge of signing an historic peace deal.
Jun 13
Exclusive: In recent weeks, Iran has dramatically escalated efforts to seal off its cache of near bomb-grade uranium, deliberately collapsing tunnels & booby-trapping entrances with explosive mines, per 5 sources familiar w/ US intel.
@KatieBoLillis, @davis_winkie, me & @NatashaBertrand
cnn.com/2026/06/13/politics/…
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Miad Maleki retweeted
Everyone focuses on Clause III. They shouldn’t.
The real problem was Clause IV: not Iran’s useless promise never to build a bomb, but the West’s acceptance of an enrichment program that, once the sunsets arrived, would evolve into an industrial-scale nuclear enterprise with advanced centrifuges and virtually no breakout time.
original iran nuclear deal:
“under no circumstances will iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapon.”
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Miad Maleki retweeted
15h
The war mongers are in Tehran, not Washington.
Between 2009 and 2025, the United States spent twelve years under Obama and Biden trying to reach a modus vivendi with the Islamic Republic. Sanctions relief, diplomacy, outreach, engagement. Yet a stable accommodation remained elusive.
Why? Veterans of the Obama team and their ideological supporters blame America’s supposed “war mongers.” The claim is absurd. The central argument of the hawks has never been that conflict is desirable. It is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a revolutionary jihadi organization that can only be deterred, not seduced.
Most Americans would prefer engagement to work. They are not eager for confrontation. They will give diplomacy every chance to succeed. But they are not willing to ignore reality indefinitely.
The problem was never those of us warning about the impossibility of a lasting accommodation with Tehran. The problem was Tehran itself.
When engagement fails year after year, American leaders return to deterrence not because American hawks are politically powerful, but because their diagnosis is far more accurate.
We hawks did not scuttle engagement. Tehran did.
From @tparsi Substack:
« After decades of failed wars, trillions of dollars squandered, hundreds of thousands of lives lost, and America’s global standing diminished, [the warmongers] increasingly rely on intimidation rather than persuasion. They will continue to attack me, my colleagues, and others who challenge their thirst for war. And who knows, they may even succeed in deporting me.
But good luck deporting an idea whose time has come.
The era of endless war is ending, and no amount of censorship, cancellation, or political intimidation will stop the growing demand for a foreign policy rooted in restraint, diplomacy, and common sense. »
open.substack.com/pub/tritap…
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Widespread disruptions are again rippling across Iran’s banking system, with customers of major banks reporting frozen accounts, dead ATMs, and downed apps.
This is another sector of Iran’s economy that’s been quietly failing for years. Iran’s banks are structurally bankrupt and the regime can’t dig itself out of this hole with a few billion dollars in frozen assets.
Most of the system is insolvent on paper. When the Central Bank dissolved Ayandeh Bank in late 2025, one of the country’s largest lenders, it carried ~$5.1B in accumulated losses, $2.9B in overdrafts, and a staggering negative 600% capital adequacy ratio. Iran’s Regulators admit at least eight other banks risk the same fate.
Several Iranian bank card services were disrupted on Saturday, with customers reporting failed payments, blocked transfers and POS errors in messages sent to Iran International.
Iranian media reported disruptions affecting cards issued by Bank Melli, Tejarat, Sepah and Saderat. Messages from users also cited problems with Mellat cards and said both online transfers and ATM or card payments were failing.
One shopkeeper said nearly 90% of bank cards had been down for about four hours, leaving customers unable to make purchases.
Another message from Mashhad said banks had been facing disruptions since the morning.
A customer said cards from Bank Melli, Mellat and Tejarat were not working at a shop, while another message said POS devices were showing an “issuer error.”
iranintl.com/en/202606136049
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Miad Maleki retweeted
In recent weeks, #Iran has dramatically escalated efforts to seal off its cache of near bomb-grade uranium, deliberately collapsing tunnels and booby-trapping entrances with explosive mines, according to five sources familiar with US intelligence.
It certainly casts doubt on the Islamic Republic's intentions and willingness to comply with any commitments it makes regarding the HEU stockpile.
cnn.com/2026/06/13/politics/…
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Jun 13
We were waiting on a Zoom link from Araghchi for “virtual signing,” instead the IRGC sent drones.
Jun 13
(Reuters) - U.S. forces shot down multiple Iranian one-way attack drones heading toward the Strait of Hormuz, a source familiar with the matter told Reuters on Friday, in the latest military flare-up even as Washington and Tehran cite progress in peace talks.
The source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the drones had posed a threat to commercial traffic. The shootdown was first reported by Reuters.
President Donald Trump had warned Iran earlier on Friday against firing more drones at ships attempting to transit the Strait, saying Tehran "better get their act together, and FAST!"
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Miad Maleki retweeted
Jun 13
Kudos to @PahlaviReza for turning an obnoxious smear into a devastating history lesson.
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Miad Maleki retweeted
Jun 12
This is a good point and why we should not allow any funds to go to the regime.
Jun 12
Lost in the noise about deal terms, and the underappreciation of the current level of U.S. leverage, is the most important piece of context:
President Trump has achieved what 45 years of U.S. policy could not. The regime's military leadership is decimated, its economy is in freefall, and it is diplomatically isolated more than ever.
Just a couple years ago Iran was building drone manufacturing in the U.S. backyard, Venezuela.
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Miad Maleki retweeted
Jun 12
True. So what an error it would be to give away that progress.
Jun 12
Lost in the noise about deal terms, and the underappreciation of the current level of U.S. leverage, is the most important piece of context:
President Trump has achieved what 45 years of U.S. policy could not. The regime's military leadership is decimated, its economy is in freefall, and it is diplomatically isolated more than ever.
Just a couple years ago Iran was building drone manufacturing in the U.S. backyard, Venezuela.
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Miad Maleki retweeted
Jun 12
💯 correct. Which is why we cannot let them up off the mat!
Jun 12
Lost in the noise about deal terms, and the underappreciation of the current level of U.S. leverage, is the most important piece of context:
President Trump has achieved what 45 years of U.S. policy could not. The regime's military leadership is decimated, its economy is in freefall, and it is diplomatically isolated more than ever.
Just a couple years ago Iran was building drone manufacturing in the U.S. backyard, Venezuela.
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Miad Maleki retweeted
Jun 12
Based on administration background briefings, Iran’s missile program is off the negotiating table. Good thing it has been so severely degraded (fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/26/…) but it will try to reconstitute — and the billions of dollars it hopes to get will help pay for Chinese help.
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Miad Maleki retweeted
Jun 12
New: @FDD nuclear expert @StrickerNonpro, our infographics team and I chart Iran’s nuclear trajectory from 2008 to 2026. We include the JCPOA counterfactual.
Trump inflicted major damage on Iran’s nuclear program (unlike his predecessors) and has leverage he shouldn’t squander.
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Jun 12
Lost in the noise about deal terms, and the underappreciation of the current level of U.S. leverage, is the most important piece of context:
President Trump has achieved what 45 years of U.S. policy could not. The regime's military leadership is decimated, its economy is in freefall, and it is diplomatically isolated more than ever.
Just a couple years ago Iran was building drone manufacturing in the U.S. backyard, Venezuela.
Jun 12
Any version of this deal with Iran means the leverage is out the window.
And there's another underappreciated enforcement cost: even temporary sanctions relief — whether waivers, authorizations, or licenses — while will fail to attract new oil buyers wary of residual risk, will actively degrades @USTreasury's ability to enforce violations that occur during the relief window and after their expiration for a significant period after it expires.
If a 60-day authorization lapses without a deal, Treasury can't simply flip the switch back on enforcement, investigators must work through transactions that were arguably authorized or occurred in a gray period.
So the leverage calculus is worse than it looks: Tehran gets the relief upfront, the Strait remains contested and risky for shippers anyway, and the U.S. walks away from a failed 60-day window with both less diplomatic leverage and a temporarily blunted enforcement posture.
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