6 Essential Requirements for a Good Iran Nuclear Deal Any credible agreement and easing of current leverage must include Iran’s binding commitment to these six provisions: fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/29/…

I’ve had a number of conversations with folks inside and outside government about the current situation with Anthropic, and here is what I believe to be true: — As we know, Anthropic publicly released its Mythos class models earlier this week under the commercial name Fable. — Fable is Mythos with guardrails. But if those guardrails fail, then you’ve exposed Mythos and its advanced cyber capabilities to people who shouldn’t have them. (Keep in mind that Anthropic itself widely promoted the idea that Mythos was a cyberweapon and needed to be regulated as such. They asked for government regulation of Mythos and championed the guardrails on Fable. If there is a vulnerability — big or small — it is Anthropic’s responsibility to patch.) — A highly credible trusted partner of both Anthropic and the USG who was testing Fable came forward with a jailbreak of those guardrails. The Admin asked Dario to fix the jailbreak or de-deploy the model. Dario refused. — In their blog post, Anthropic defended its decision by saying the jailbreak isn’t serious. That is not what the trusted partner and the USG believe; nor is that kind of minimizing language consistent with Anthropic’s brand as the AI safety company. It’s difficult to fathom how they could claim a jailbreak allowing operability of a cyber weapon could be defined as not “serious.” — In the past, Anthropic has always said that safety must be top priority and taken super seriously. In this case, Anthropic prioritized the continued offering of the consumer model over safety. — In reaction, the Admin issued the export control. The Admin did this reluctantly. It’s been very surprised that Anthropic hasn’t wanted to cooperate with a reasonable safety request (ie fixing the jailbreak issue). Anthropic’s reaction is very much at odds with their branding and ethos as a safe AI research community. — The Admin’s hope now is that Anthropic remediates the safety issue, the export control is lifted, and Fable goes back into general release. The Admin wants all of this to happen as soon as possible. It is frankly bewildered that Anthropic hasn’t wanted to comply with safety requests that it previously said were its highest priority. — Those trying to misdirect and tie this action to the prior DoW/Anthropic issues are wrong. The Admin values Anthropic’s technical capabilities and feels that this issue, while serious, should be easily resolved. The ball is in Anthropic’s court.

The 2025-2026 strikes did what diplomacy couldn't: no operating enrichment plants in Iran for the first time since 2006. The next agreement must lock that in — full, verified dismantlement. New interactive timeline from @StrickerNonpro and @mdubowitz ⬇️ fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/12/…

4/4 Even if the administration wants to give broader oil sanctions relief, a stack of congressional statutes doesn't bend to a general license: 🔹 ISA (1996): Mandates sanctions on foreign investment in Iran's energy sector 🔹 CISADA (2010): Mandatory banking sanctions on FFIs facilitating transactions with designated Iranian banks; SWIFT access restrictions 🔹 NDAA §1245 (FY2012): Requires blocking/severe restrictions on FFIs conducting significant transactions with CBI for oil purchases 🔹 IFCA (2013, NDAA FY2013): Broad sanctions on Iran's energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors; sanctions on provision of insurance/reinsurance 🔹 Iran TRA (2012): Expands secondary sanctions, explicitly sanctions transportation of crude oil from Iran; penalizes U.S. parent companies for foreign subsidiary violations 🔹 SHIP Act (2024): Mandates sanctions on anyone who knowingly transports, refines, or conducts ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian-origin oil — no Iranian person involvement required; targets the goods, not just the actors 🔹 Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act (2024): Authorizes sanctions on Chinese financial institutions facilitating Iranian oil transactions, without a "significant transaction" threshold None of these are waived by a GL U-style authorization. Any broader relief requires either presidential waiver authority exercised formally under each statute, or Congress. The financial chokehold on Iran's oil revenue stays in place regardless of what's signed in an MOU.

"Oil sanctions waiver" for Iran in the MOU is most likely the same General License that @USTreasury issued on March 20, 2026, a narrow authorization covering crude already loaded on vessels. Here are some details: 1/4 Don't expect this authorization to open a new market for Iranian oil. Iran's buyers aren't switching. China accounts for roughly 90% of Iran's oil exports, with independent "teapot" refineries in Shandong province absorbing the majority of that trade. These refiners already accept the sanctions risk. If anything, a temporary license gives them marginal cover — but once it lapses, they'll keep buying anyway. New Western buyers aren't coming, new Asian buyers highly unlikely.

The war mongers are in Tehran, not Washington. Between 2009 and 2025, the United States spent twelve years under Obama and Biden trying to reach a modus vivendi with the Islamic Republic. Sanctions relief, diplomacy, outreach, engagement. Yet a stable accommodation remained elusive. Why? Veterans of the Obama team and their ideological supporters blame America’s supposed “war mongers.” The claim is absurd. The central argument of the hawks has never been that conflict is desirable. It is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a revolutionary jihadi organization that can only be deterred, not seduced. Most Americans would prefer engagement to work. They are not eager for confrontation. They will give diplomacy every chance to succeed. But they are not willing to ignore reality indefinitely. The problem was never those of us warning about the impossibility of a lasting accommodation with Tehran. The problem was Tehran itself. When engagement fails year after year, American leaders return to deterrence not because American hawks are politically powerful, but because their diagnosis is far more accurate. We hawks did not scuttle engagement. Tehran did.

See our interactive to understand: most of Iran’s nuclear expansion occurred under the Biden administration, the patient pathways to nuclear weapons under the sunsetting Obama deal, and how U.S. and Israeli strikes have done severe damage to Iran’s enrichment program.👇

Unclear if this is in reference to the “objects” / “rock/earthen mound chicane barriers” we observed placed along the road leading to a backfilled tunnel entrance at Fordow. It is possible that enriched uranium was stored in that tunnel, although we cannot confirm this. Esfahan is an obvious option since Iran had internal access to at least the Northern tunnel portal and possibly the middle one, too. Iran could have placed mines inside the backfilled tunnels there. We are searching for more information.

“This is the same framework as the agreement to end the war in Gaza,” an Israeli official tells Channel 12. “Ask yourself what has happened since then with the commitment to disarm Hamas? What will be the Americans’ essential leverage if, after 60 days of a ceasefire, the Iranians do not begin the steps required of them? The credible military threat has been all but eroded.” timesofisrael.com/liveblog_e…

This is simply not the case: “In fact, they no longer want a Nuclear Weapon…” “No cash will exchange hands” — this ignores the oil waivers and releases from frozen assets worth billions to the regime. My advice: don’t oversell any deal the way the Obama administration did.

📈 NEW interactive from @StrickerNonpro and @mdubowitz: Track Iran's nuclear enrichment from the late 1990s through the 2025-2026 strikes that destroyed most of Tehran's program. See how stockpiles grew across 4 administrations — and what the JCPOA would have allowed. fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/12/…

President Trump is exactly right about the fatally flawed JCPOA. But let’s temper our enthusiasm and suspend judgment. The hard part lies ahead: convincing Tehran to surrender all of its enriched uranium stockpiles, dismantle its entire nuclear infrastructure (much of it severely degraded), accept a permanent ban on enrichment and reprocessing (Iran cannot do this for the first time in two decades), agree to anywhere, anytime inspections, and accept restrictions on the reconstitution of its (severely degraded) missile program and support for terrorism. Mr. President, we’re rooting for you to get this right. 🇺🇸

Remember, Mr. President, down-blending and letting Iran keep the material is a reversible constraint. You must dismantle all enrichment infrastructure, and destroy or remove all LEU and HEU material.

Everyone focuses on Clause III. They shouldn’t. The real problem was Clause IV: not Iran’s useless promise never to build a bomb, but the West’s acceptance of an enrichment program that, once the sunsets arrived, would evolve into an industrial-scale nuclear enterprise with advanced centrifuges and virtually no breakout time.

Decades of buildup. One year of strikes. See how Iran's nuclear enrichment program rose—and was dismantled — in @StrickerNonpro and @mdubowitz's new interactive timeline. fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/12/…

From what we know: Even on a phase one (Strait only) deal, Iran receives roughly $8B from oil trade over 60 days—reducing incentives for phase two (nuclear commitments). And Iran now claims it would maintain control of the Strait with fees. Last night with @kaitlancollins.

The US and Iran’s “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding” will be signed virtually tomorrow, according to Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The most worthless statement in international diplomacy: “Iran: we promise not to build or acquire a nuclear weapon.”

Nothing says you intend to turn over your HEU stockpile like further sealing it in. On the other hand, there have been stories since February about secret U.S. plans to seize it.

The Apache was scanning the night sky for Iranian threats to commercial ships below shortly after 1 a.m. local time on Tuesday when the drone detonated directly in front of it, U.S. officials said. The drone’s infrared-guidance device landed in one of the pilot’s laps, burning through part of his flight suit. What was left of the drone wedged itself inside the aircraft.  New details tonight wsj.com/world/middle-east/ir…