A note on why the GRANITE Act foreign censorship shield law was designed the way it was, creating a private right of action rather than what Adam has suggested here.
GRANITE is designed to do one thing: invert the cost-exchange ratio of foreign censorship.
A “cost-exchange ratio” is a military concept from Cold War nuclear counterforce doctrine. It refers to the marginal cost of an attacker to successfully land a nuclear warhead on the assets of a defender.
If, for example, an attacker can launch 100 warheads costing $100,000 each, that cost a defender $10 million per intercept to shoot down, the cost-exchange ratio strongly favors the attacker over the defense.
The attacker can build more warheads than the defender can ever possibly defend against.
So it is with foreign censorship, which is currently trivially cheap to attempt, and extremely expensive for an American target to defend against.
It costs nothing for Ofcom to send an e-mail into the United States, voluntary compliance rates (borne of fear) will be high, and any defense – such as that we attempted in the 4chan case – requires millions of dollars of legal time, an investment which, due to current FSIA/IOIA doctrine, limits prospects for recovery.
We think American law should benefit the American defender, not the foreign attacker, and should make foreign censorship extremely costly to attempt, and trivially easy to defend against.
Getting this to work effectively against foreign censors requires fundamental changes to FSIA/IOIA doctrine, including recovery against sovereign assets.
This will not be a windfall for the plaintiff's bar. Foreign institutions are run by humans, and humans respond to incentives.
If the cost of attempting to censor an American is prohibitive, the censorship attempts will stop.
# 2 jawboning reform: Stopping foreign thuggery